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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss related work from literature in security and distributed data management in general, and mobile security 
and peer-to-peer collaborative processes in specic. Signicant work has been done to address security for various aspects of 
networking, data storage, device security, etc. for wired networks or networks with centralized or federated control. We compare 
and contrast the security requirements for resource sharing in pervasive ecosystems, and provide brief descriptions of related work 
with a focus on mobile devices. 
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1.  Introduction 
A myriad of services are available via wireless interfaces throughout the pervasive environment. Use cases for 
pervasive environments are slowly evolving from client-server to collaborative peering relations. As computing 
becomes pervasive, people expect to access services and information anytime and anywhere. These systems lack 
centralized control, are not under any single administrative domain, and in addition their users are not all known a-priori. 
Moreover, devices are only guaranteed to be able to communicate with peers in their vicinity – Internet connectivity is 
‘limited.’ 
Ranganathan[1] has identied ve security problems that arise out of inherent properties of pervasive environments, 
viz., (1) device authentication, (2) privacy, (3) trust management, (4) device assurance and, (5) recourse. Hubaux et al.[2] 
classify threats for MANETs at the networking layer to be of two types, viz (1) attacks on the cooperative network layer 
routing substrate, and (2) attacks on the security mechanisms protecting the MANET itself. We address only the trust, 
reputation and data management, and also address long term accountability (recourse). 
Security for pervasive environments, is about what particular threats need to be addressed, depending on the threat 
model. These threats are different depending on the application scenario, e.g., a battleeld scenario or a civilian airport 
terminal. Typically we will be dealing with civilian scenarios, though some of the techniques we are proposing will be 
applicable to military scenarios as well 
2. Nature and Composition of Pervasive environments 
Elements constituting a resource rich environment are mobile devices like car computers, wearable com-puters, 
handheld devices, laptops etc. Personal area networks (PANs) or body-area networks composed of wearable devices are 
an example of pre-congured networked portable devices and can be abstracted as a single entity – a set of devices 
collaborating to perform the user’s tasks – working towards a common goal. Personal devices function to serve the 
goals and tasks of the individual users, whereas the devices embedded in the infrastructure providing useful services 
like alerts, interfaces to sensor networks, location information, weather, trafc conditions, etc., constitute the resource-
rich environment. 
We envision that portable devices and other ambient devices embedded in the physical infrastructure of pervasive 
environments – of various forms and functions, will largely outnumber individual users. Computational effort and 
storage capacities will seldom be in short supply. Micro/nano-sensor networks, temporary community storage/staging 
 
 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
 Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Intelligent Information Technology Application
 Research  Association.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1878-0296 © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
 Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Intelligent Information Technology Application  Research Association.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
335Hu Zhao and Sangen Wang / Procedia Environmental Sciences 11 (2011) 334 – 338
Author name / Procedia Environmental Sciences 00 (2011) 000–000 
areas will be available for use by mobile devices. However nding reliable and relevant information and services in a 
timely manner, in this data-intensive and resource-rich environment, will be a challenge. 
Smart homes and smart ofces are commonly professed examples since they typically have network infrastructures. 
However, even with minimal networking support, pervasive environments can exist in freeways and public places like 
beaches and parks. In the near future most of the basic day-to-day activities regardless of location will be augmented by 
autonomously functioning portable devices. Although much of the technology required to build such systems is cheaply 
available today – portable computing devices, abundant miniature storage, low power wireless communication, and 
energy conserving processors – several challenges lie in making this vision a viable reality. 
A single device or an ensemble of mobile devices (e.g., wearable or portable computers embedded in apparel or 
accessories), should be able to dynamically identify and authenticate each other with minimal user intervention. 
3. Architecture 
As shown in gure V.1, there are essentially three components on the client side(mobile device) viz. the Policy 
Manager, Context Manager, and the Policy Enforcer. The Beacon is located on a local network device possibly co-
located with the wireless base station. The server hosts the Policy Server and the Policy Engine. The beacon 
periodically broadcasts heartbeats that the sentient Context Manager on the device continuously monitors.The role of 
the Policy enforcer is to enforce the currently selected policy, whereas the Context Manager is responsible for 
monitoring the context of the device and selecting the appropriate current policy. The device boots up with an initial 
default policy. The context manager listens for updates from the policy server. The device can be transit between the 
home network and other known or unknown networks. Beacons are deployed across the wireless networks, which 
periodically broadcasts heartbeats. The context manager listens for these heartbeats and based on the information 
contained in the heartbeat, can determine if it is within a trusted network. This state is continuously monitored. In the 
event that heartbeats are not heard for a prolonged interval of time, the context manager assumes that it is no longer 
within the trusted network and immediately reverts to the policy prescribed for untrusted networks. 
Pietro and Mancini[3] point out that it is important to restrict the web presence of a service to reduce the complexity 
and trafc for a given network infrastructure. In our design the issued policies are valid only within the scope of the 
broadcast, that is the hop-count of the broadcast determines how far the heartbeats will be heard. As soon as the user is 
outside this scope, the policy is no longer valid and the device reverts to the highly restrictive default policy. Thus this 
mechanism has two effects, viz. it restricts the scope of operation to a particular area, use of granted privileges is 
disallowed outside this scope and, secondly a context is provided to the device so that only the relevant service 
interfaces may be exposed in communicating with the handheld device. A device possessing some capabilities allowed 
by the enforced policy will allow the device to access local services, whereas remote services can always be exposed via 
proxies if necessary. 
Heartbeats are signed by the owner entities and can be veried by other entities involved. Using a PKI infrastructure 
with X.509 certicates is feasible in this scenario. Trust issues are resolved using CA certicates installed in the mobile 
device. 
Each of the modules shown in gure V.1 are described in the following subsections. Section V.E.1 describes the 
policy language Rei, section V.E.2 describes the policy engine and section V.E.3 describes the Beacon. Sections V.E.4, 
V.E.5, and V.E.6 describe the context manager, policy manager, and the policy enforcer respectively. 
 
Figure 1.  Policy Enforcement Infrastructure 
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4. Rei Policy Engine and Policy Server 
The security policy is described to the Rei Engine using the Rei Ontology. As shown in gure V.2, a domain 
specic ontology may also be used to describe domain specic information. The Rei policy engine reasons over the 
policies described to it in the Rei policy language. The Rei Engine has a Java front-end and uses Prolog for its reasoning 
engine. The role of the Rei engine is to grant access or deny access to requests made by principals in the domain. The 
policy server is responsible for handling access requests from the various devices in the system, presenting them to the 
Rei Engine and then distributing these policy certicates to the requesting entities. 
The Policy Server rst presents the Rei Engine with the current state information of the device in question, which 
normally includes in the least, the device identier, the person in possession of the device and the location of the device. 
The Policy Server then consults the Rei Policy Engine to create a new policy certicate with the granted requests. The 
policy server then issues this newly created policy certicate to the requesting device. For this particular scenario, the 
Rei Engine is loaded with the local network acceptable use policy. Later queries to the Rei Engine provide additional 
information about the location of the device, user of the device etc., when the new policy certicate is to be issued. The 
policy server issues the request for resource access to the policy engine. The policy engine reasons over the current 
status of the system and based on the policy for the role of the subject, issues a policy certicate. 
 
Figure 2.  Rei Policy Engine 
5. Example Scenarios 
5.1. Home Network 
Consider the following scenario depicted in gure V.3. Bob is a Ph.D. student afliated with the lab “A”. He has 
been issued a mobile device that belongs to lab “A”. All the lab devices are equipped with the policy enforcement 
mechanisms described earlier. The lab “A” policy allows all Ph.D students who are afliated with the lab to be able to 
use lab “A”’s resources and use the full capabilities of the device they have been leased, while in the “A” lab. 
 
Figure 3.  Home network and foreign network 
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Bob has authenticated himself to the device and, initially the policy enforcer has enforced the default policy on the 
device, which allows minimal communication. As Bob walks into the “A” lab, the device hears the heartbeats from a 
beacon. The device veries that the signature is from one of the beacons it trusts. The context manager then reads the 
contents of the heartbeat message and signals the policy manager to retrieve the policy server’s address, and issue a 
request for a policy certicate to the policy server. The default policy ensures that such minimal communication is 
allowed, though other capabilities of the devices remain disabled. The policy server is provided with the device 
identier, the user and the location of the device(based on which beacon’s heartbeats were heard). The policy server 
now transforms this information into domain specic information in the Rei language. Then the Rei Engine is queried 
for access requests based on the device capabilities. A device specic policy certicate is then created, signed by the 
policy server and issued to the requesting device. The policy manager on the device issues this policy to the policy 
enforcer. The new policy is then enforced for the time duration specied in the policy certicate. In this case, since Bob 
is a Ph.D. student and the device was leased to him, he will be able make unrestricted use of the device capabilities 
within the lab. 
When Bob leaves the lab, and is out of range of the beacon, the device can no longer hear the heartbeats. The 
context manager on the device resets a timer each time it hears a heartbeat. When no heartbeats are heard for a 
prolonged interval(twice the heartbeat interval), the timer goes off and the context manager resets the device to use the 
default policy. The policy certicate is valid only for the time interval specied within the certicate and heartbeats 
from a trusted beacon can be heard. 
5.2. Other trusted Networks 
Now suppose that Bob, leaves the “A” lab but is still within the university campus and walks into another lab “B” 
which has a trusted beacon. This lab however has a policy that foreign devices should only be able to use web services 
via 802.11 but not use IrDA or Bluetooth. This policy may conict with lab “A”’s policy that all Ph.D. students be 
allowed unrestricted use of the device’s capabilities. However the meta-rules specied in the Rei language can be used 
to resolve these conicts. e.g. the meta-rule may resolve the conict by specifying that the lab policy where the device is 
present should have priority over all other policies. specifications of this template. You will need to determine whether 
or not your equation should be typed using either th 
6. Summary and Discussion 
In this paper we have presented a proof of concept implementation of a policy enforcement infrastructure for mobile 
devices. We have used a semantic policy language Rei to express security policies. Rei allows policies to be expressed 
in higher levels of abstraction without requiring knowledge of all possible entities. Policies can be expressed in terms of 
domain specic information. The policy engine is used to make decisions of allowing or disallowing access requests 
from actors in the domain. 
In our prototype implementation, we demonstrated how a policy can be expressed in the Rei policy language using 
the Rei Ontology and an augmenting domain specic ontology to describe rights, prohibitions, obligations, 
dispensations an actor has on the domain actions. We showed how a mobile device equipped with a policy enforcer can 
be used to dynamically change its behavior and capabilities in a pervasive environment using this security infrastructure. 
We demonstrated the use of the expressivity of a high level semantic language Rei for describing system wide policies, 
the dynamic creation of device level policies, policy distribution and, enforcement of these policies on mobile devices. 
As noted earlier, the devices with the policy enforcers are themselves trusted devices and cooperate with the security 
infrastructure. The policy enforcers serve as automatic guards that enforce the correct policy based on current state of 
the device. This infrastructure addresses security concerns resulting from vulnerabilities in the software or hardware 
implementations of the device. The security infrastructure does not protect against intentional misuse or attacks. 
An alternative to issuing policies from a Policy Server is to use smartcards that contain the policy certicate[4]. The 
smartcard adds to the hardware requirements of a device. However it is the least obtrusive, since the policy can be 
enforced so long as the the card monitor noties the existence of the card. In case of the Policy Server, the sentient 
program listens for heartbeats from the beacon. It may happen that during periods of severe network congestion 
heartbeats are lost and the devices suddenly revert to their default policy which will be very disruptive for the users. 
However in the case of the Policy Server, the policy certicates are created dynamically and are adapted to the context 
of the device. Also, listening to heartbeats is usually free since most mobile devices come equipped for wireless 
connectivity, no additional hardware is required. In case of smartcards, the policy is statically issued and stored on the 
smartcard, it does not change or adapt to changes in a pervasive environment. 
An important contribution of the work described in this paper is the actual prototype that has automatic guards based 
on expressive security policies. In the current implementation there is total reliance on a security infrastructure, e.g., 
secure beacons whose availability enforce context specic policies, otherwise a restrictive default policy is enforced. 
Inbuilt tamper-proof hardware security like smartcards can act as secure stores for security policies and can be 
recharged from time to time. Using an expressive policy language like Rei, these devices can then be congured with 
generic policies that are adaptive to their current requirements goals based on temporal or spatial contexts. 
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In subsequent research we will focus our work on how monitoring network conditions, detecting anomalous 
behavior, measuring availability of trustworthy sources of data streams can be used to adapt to dynamic environmental 
conditions and resource availability. While the security policies enforced by the security kernels with the help of 
tamperproof hardware can protect the communication, network interfaces, and data on the device itself, the availability 
of trusted information sources in a pervasive ecosystem cannot always be assumed. 
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